Virsa Singh Vs. The State of Punjab

Judges: P.B. Gajendragadkar, Syed Jaffer Imam and Vivian Bose, JJ.

Facts:

The appellant Virsa Singh has been sentenced to imprisonment for life under Section 302 of the Indian Penal Code (IPC) for the murder of Khem Singh. The appellant was tried with five others under Sections 302/149, 324/149 and 323/149 of IPC and he was also charged individually under Section 302 of IPC on ground that although only one injury has been caused by him on victim but the same was sufficient to cause death in the ordinary course of nature.

The Sessions Judge observed that although the common intention was to injure the deceased and not to cause death, but death was caused because of rash and silly actions and forceful blow given by Appellant. Therefore, Section 300, 3rdly (3) of IPC applied and Appellant is liable to be convicted under Section 302 of IPC. He was sentenced to life imprisonment. The other accused were charged under Sections 323/149, 324/149 and 36 of IPC but acquitted from the charges under Section 302 of IPC. On appeal, the High Court has upheld the Appellant's conviction. Hence, the matter reached before the present court.

Issues:

(i) Whether the injury inflicted by Appellant satisfied the requirement of Section 300, 3rdly of IPC?

Law:

Indian Penal Code - Section 300 - Except in the cases hereinafter excepted, culpable homicide is murder, if the act by which the death is caused is done with the intention of causing death, or; Secondly - If it is done with the intention of causing such bodily injury as the offender knows to be likely to cause the death of the person to whom the harm is caused, or; Thirdly - If it is done with the intention of causing bodily injury to any person and the bodily injury intended to be inflicted is sufficient in the ordinary course of nature to cause death, or; Fourthly - If the person committing the act knows that it is so imminently dangerous that it must, in all probability, cause death or such bodily injury as is likely to cause death, and commits such act without any excuse for incurring the risk of causing death or such injury as aforesaid.

Contentions

Appellant

The facts do not disclose an offence of murder because the prosecution has not proved that there was an intention to inflict a bodily injury that was sufficient to cause death in the ordinary course of nature. The intention that the section requires must be related, not only to the bodily injury inflicted, but also to the clause, "and the bodily injury intended to be inflicted is sufficient in the ordinary course of nature to cause death.

Analysis

(i) So far as argument related to intention is concerned, if there is an intention to inflict an injury that is sufficient to cause death in the ordinary course of nature, then the intention is to kill and in that event, the "thirdly" would be unnecessary because the act would fall under the first part of the Section 300 of IPC.

(ii) To establish the case under Section 300, 3rdly of IPC, the prosecution must prove the following facts: First, it must establish, quite objectively, that a bodily injury is present; Secondly, the nature of the injury must be proved; These are purely objective investigations; Thirdly, it must be proved that there was an intention to inflict that particular bodily injury, that is to say, that it was not accidental or unintentional, or that some other kind of injury was intended; Fourthly, it must be proved that the injury of the type just described made up of the three elements set out above is sufficient to cause death in the ordinary course of nature. This part of the enquiry is purely objective and inferential and has nothing to do with the intention of the offender.

(iii)Once these four elements are established by the prosecution, the offence is murder under s. 300, 3rdly and in such situation it does not matter that there was no intention to cause death. It does not matter that there was no intention even to cause an injury of a kind that is sufficient to cause death in the ordinary course of nature. It does not even matter that there is no knowledge that an act of that kind will be likely to cause death. Once the intention to cause the bodily injury actually found to be proved, the rest of the enquiry is purely objective and the only question is whether, as a matter of purely objective inference, the injury is sufficient in the ordinary course of nature to cause death.

Conclusion:

No evidence or explanation is given about why the appellant thrust a spear into the abdomen of the deceased with such force that it penetrated the bowels and three coils of the intestines came out of the wound and that digested food oozed out from cuts in three places. In the absence of evidence, or reasonable explanation, that the prisoner did not intend to stab in the stomach with a degree of force sufficient to penetrate that far into the body, or to indicate that his act was a regrettable accident and that he intended otherwise, it would be perverse to conclude that he did not intend to inflict the injury that he did. Once that intent is established, the rest is a matter for objective determination from the medical and other evidence about the nature and seriousness of the injury. Thus, Appeal dismissed.