Judges: A.M. Ahmadi CJI, M.M. Punchhi, K. Ramaswamy, S.P. Bharucha, S. Saghir Ahmad, K. Venkataswami and K.T. Thomas, JJ.

Facts:

The impact of Articles 323-A and 323-B of the Indian Constitution (under which Tribunals were established) on the High Court's (under Articles 226 and 227) and Supreme Court's (under Article 32) judicial review and superintendence powers was in dispute in this case. Several special leave applications, civil appeals, and writ petitions formed the batch of matters presented before the Supreme Court in this case. These issues arose as a result of separate judgements by several High Courts and various clauses in various statutes, resulting in multiple unique legal issues that were clubbed together in one case, for appropriate adjudication.

Among the questions presented was the constitutional validity of Articles 323-A(2)(d) and 323-B(3)(d) of the Constitution of India, 1950, as well as the Administrative Tribunals Act, 1985. A source of dispute was also whether the Tribunals constituted under Part XIV-A of the Indian Constitution can act as viable alternatives to the High Courts in exercising the power of judicial review.

Issues:

(i) Whether the power conferred upon Parliament or the State Legislatures, as the case may be, by Sub-clause (d) of Clause (2) of Article 323A or by Sub-clause (d) of Clause (3) of Article 323B of the Constitution, totally exclude the jurisdiction of 'all courts', except that of the Supreme Court under Article 136, in respect of disputes and complaints referred to in Clause (1) of Article 323A or with regard to all or any of the matters specified in Clause (2) of Article 323B, runs counter to the power of judicial review conferred on the High Courts under Articles 226/227 and on the Supreme Court under Article 32 of the Constitution?

(ii) Whether the Tribunals, constituted either under Article 323A or under Article 323B of the Constitution, possess the competence to test the constitutional validity of a statutory provision/rule?

(iii) Whether these Tribunals, as they are functioning at present, can be said to be effective substitutes for the High Courts in discharging the power of judicial review? If not, what are the changes required to make them conform to their founding objectives?

Law:

Constitution of India - Article 323A - Authorises Parliament to create administrative tribunals to adjudicate disputes and complaints relating to the recruitment and conditions of service of government employees in both the federal and state governments. Such tribunals shall be established at the federal and state levels. It provided that the statute should include provisions regarding tribunal jurisdiction, power, and authority, as well as the procedure to be followed by tribunals. It shall also include provisions relating to exclusion of all courts except the Supreme Court of India from jurisdiction under Article 136 of the Constitution.

Constitution of India-Article 323B- The Parliament and state legislatures are authorised to create tribunals for the adjudication of disputes pertaining to the following topics under Article 323 B -

• Taxation
• Foreign exchange, import and export
• Industrial and labour
• Land reforms
• Ceiling on urban property
• Elections to Parliament and state legislatures
• Food stuff
• Rent and tenancy rights

The Administrative Tribunals Act, 1985 - It establishes three categories of administrative tribunals -

• The Central Administrative Tribunal, which is established by the Union government.
• Upon receipt of a request in this regard from any State Government, the Central Government may create an administrative tribunal for such State employees.
• Two or more states may petition for a combined tribunal, known as the Joint Administrative Tribunal (JAT), to exercise administrative tribunal functions for them.

Contentions:

Petitioners

To declare Articles 323A(2)(d) and 323B(3)(d) unconstitutional, allowing tribunals to exercise exclusive authority formerly reserved for High Courts under Article 227. 

To declare Section 5(6) of the Act, inasmuch as it permits a Single Member Bench of a Tribunal to examine the constitutional validity of a legislative provision and declare it invalid, to be unconstitutional.

While the Act's provisions do not pretend to impact the Supreme Court's jurisdiction under Article 32 of the Constitution, Articles 323A and 323B allow Parliament to follow a course that may hinder the Tribunals' authority in the future, and are thus likely to be thrown down.

Respondents

To uphold the constitutional provisions in question and to allow such tribunals to exercise their powers under Article 226 of the Constitution.

It must be assumed that Parliament was aware of such a situation, and it must be established that Article 32's authority was not meant to be impacted. The High Courts' Article 226 authority, on the other hand, was attempted to be abolished by establishing alternative institutional processes.

The argument put forward in Sampath Kumar's case is founded on good reasoning and does not need to be revisited.

There is no vice of unconstitutionality in Section 5(6) because the decisions of this Court in Amulya Chandra's case and Dr. Mahabal Ram's case held that matters relating to the vires of a provision should be dealt with by a Bench consisting of a judicial member, and these guidelines will be followed in the future.

Analysis:

The fundamental theme of this judgement was that the Tribunals cannot and will not act as a replacement for the High Courts' constitutionally established judicial review jurisdiction. The Tribunals shall act as auxiliary institutions to the High Court as it conducts its duties. Furthermore, the Tribunals will be overseen by the High Courts and cannot be considered autonomous bodies.

Jurisdiction of Supreme Court and High Courts

(i) Section 28 of the Administrative Tribunals Act was although originally enacted in express terms with Article 323A of the Constitution, with the exception of the Supreme Court's jurisdiction under Article 136, the provision had already been amended by the time the final hearing of Sampat Kumar's case was completed in order to preserve the Supreme Court's jurisdiction under Article 32 of the Constitution. Because the Sampat Kumar case concerned the Supreme Court's judicial review power and had already been returned to the court, the court expressed satisfaction with the position as it had emerged during the pendency of the case, and that the court did not venture to address the larger question of whether Article 323A (2) also required a similar amendment.

(ii) The Act's main objective was to establish a self-contained, self-sufficient, and exclusive forum for resolving all service-related disputes. It was made clear, however, that it was only intended to be used as a substitute, not a supplement. It then looked at instances after Sampat Kumar and discovered that none of them directly addressed the matter of the Administrative Tribunals' jurisdiction to declare a legislation or provision unconstitutional.

Competence of Tribunals

If the power of judicial review under Article 32 of the Constitution, which has been dubbed the Constitution's "heart and soul", may be conferred on any other court, there is no reason why the authority vested on the High Court under Article 226 cannot be done as well. Under Articles 226/227 and 32, the jurisdictions of the High Court and Supreme Court, as well as the role of the Tribunals as a supplementary body, must be retained.

In light of the enormous surge in litigation, it is vital to provide Tribunals more judicial review powers. In this aspect, the ruling in Sampat Kumar's case was sound, as it applied the notion of alternative institutional mechanisms in the face of the High Court's severe backlog of cases.

However, it was decided that the Tribunals' jurisdiction would be subject to review by the High Court under Articles 226 and 227. This serves two purposes, first, it ensures that frivolous claims are sorted out through the Tribunal's adjudication process, and second, it ensures that the High Court retains its judicial review jurisdiction.

As a result, the Supreme Court decided that tribunals established under Article 323A or 323B of the Constitution have the authority to examine the constitutional legality of a legislative provision or regulation under review by the High Court.

Tribunal as replacement of High Courts

The Court made it clear throughout the ruling that the Tribunals are not replacements for the High Court, but rather supplements, and recommended the following changes -

• They will serve as a complement to the High Courts, and all decisions made by the Tribunals will be scrutinised by a Division Bench of the individual High Courts.
• The argument that Administrative members should not be appointed to Administrative courts cannot be accepted since a sensible combination of judicial and grass-roots members would be better suited for the goal of delivering justice quickly and efficiently.
• Tribunals should be subject to the High Court's monitoring authority to increase their efficiency. In this behalf, the Ministry may retain the jurisdiction to establish an independent supervisory body to oversee the work of the tribunals.

Conclusion:

(i) The essential component of the Constitution is the power of judicial review of legislative action conferred in the High Courts and the Supreme Court under Articles 226 and 32, respectively.

(ii) The underlying component of the Constitution is the power of judicial supervision over the judgments of all courts and tribunals within their jurisdiction.

(iii) The High Courts and the Supreme Court cannot be excluded from judicial review of legislative action taken in the exercise of power by subordinate judges or Tribunals established under regular law. They can, however, play a complementary - rather than a replacement - function in this regard.

(iv) Tribunals established under Articles 323A and 323B have the authority to assess the legality of subordinate laws, with the exception of parent acts. Under Articles 226/227 of the Indian Constitution, all of its rulings will be scrutinised by a Division Bench of their respective High Courts. Under Article 136, there would be no direct appeal to the Supreme Court. The directive would take effect prospectively. The Tribunals will, nevertheless, continue to act like Courts of first instance in respect of the areas of law for which they have been constituted.

(v) It is not necessary to prohibit the appointment of administrative members.

(vi) Until a completely autonomous body is established to oversee the work of the Tribunals, all of them will be governed by a single nodal ministry, whose members will be drawn from the Ministry of Law.

(vii) Articles 323-A(2)(d) and 323-B(3)(d) of the Constitution, to the extent they exclude the jurisdiction of the High Courts and the Supreme Court under Articles 226/227 and 32 of the Constitution, are unconstitutional.

(viii) Section 28 of the Administrative Tribunals Act, 1985 (Act 13 of 1985) and the "exclusion of jurisdiction" clauses in all other legislations enacted under the aegis of Articles 323A and 323B would, to the same extent, be unconstitutional.

(ix) The jurisdiction conferred upon the High Courts under Articles 226/227 and upon the Supreme Court under Article 32 of the Constitution is part of the inviolable basic structure of our Constitution. While this jurisdiction cannot be ousted, other courts and Tribunals may perform a supplemental role in discharging the powers conferred by Articles 226/227 and 32 of the Constitution.

Important Precedents:

(i) J.B. Chopra and Others v. UOI

(ii) M.B. Majumdar v. UOI

(iii) R.K. Jain v. UOI

(iv) Amuya Chandra Kalita v. UOI

(v) Dr. Mahabal Ram v. Indian Council of Agricultural Research